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We assess the time varying features of fiscal sustainability in the euro area via revisiting the 
empirical relationship between the primary budget surplus and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Focusing on a 
sample of 11 Euro-area countries between 1999Q1 and 2013Q4 and by means of time series 
analyses, we find that: i) fiscal policy seems to have been sustainable in Belgium, France, Germany 
and Netherlands and a Ricardian (monetary dominant) regime might have been present; ii) debt 
exhibited a negative response following an innovation in the budget surplus in half of the sample; 
iii) the time-varying coefficient model shows that the 2008-2009 global economic and financial 
crisis exerted a sizeable negative impact on fiscal sustainability; iv) expenditure-based fiscal rules 
are strong determinants of fiscal sustainability. All in all, we found some evidence against the Fiscal 
Theory of the Price Level.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The relevance of fiscal developments for price behaviour and inflation can be traced back to 
some rather recent work linked to the so-called Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), initially 
made popular by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994, 1995). On the other hand, this 
discussion links further back to Sargent and Wallace (1975), and to the controversy of using rules to 
control the nominal interest rate, which may lead to price level indeterminacy. In a nutshell the 
main idea is that fiscal policy may have a relevant role, at least as important as monetary policy, in 
determining the price level.  
Nevertheless, several authors argued against such theoretical possibility, notably McCallum 
(2001), and Buiter (2002). In addition, most available empirical assessments, provided by, for 
instance, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), Cochrane (1998) and Woodford (1995), and Afonso 
(2008), point to the lack of adherence to the idea that price level may be determined via the 
intertemporal government budget constraint, given that governments are in fact quite Ricardian.  
Weichenrieder and Zimmer (2014) also assess the euro area responsiveness of the primary balance 
to government indebtedness. Therefore, the primary budget balance reacts to government debt to 
ensure fiscal solvency, implying the existence of an active monetary policy, and a passive fiscal 
policy.  
In this paper we perform a systematic analysis of the relationship between the primary surplus 
and the debt-to-GDP ratio for a sample of 11 Euro-area countries using quarterly data between 
1999Q1 and 2013Q4. In line with Bohn (1998) our approach provides an indirect test on the 
solvency of public finances and the exercise relies more specifically on the estimation of long-run 
cointegrating relationships as well as short-run Granger causality and impulse response function 
analyses. In addition to being the first paper to explore the sustainability question using quarterly 
data, we also include a novelty aspect which is to estimate country-specific time-varying coefficient 
models and use the resulting estimates to assess whether, within the EU fiscal framework, fiscal 
rules act as important determinants for public finances’ solvency. Moreover, we also consider a 
logistic regression to assess if fiscal rules increase the likelihood of a sustainable fiscal policy. 
Our results point to the sustainability of fiscal policy in Belgium, France, Germany and 
Netherlands and further Granger causality analysis suggests that a Ricardian or monetary dominant 
regime might have been present. For the remainder of the countries no firm conclusion can be 





exhibits a statistically significant negative response following an innovation in the budget surplus in 
half of the sample. Furthermore, the time-varying coefficient model uncovers the sizeable negative 
impact to public finances’ sustainability of the global financial crisis, but also some reasons for 
optimism going forward with the recovery process progressing satisfactorily. Finally, fiscal rules, 
expenditure-based in particular, are strong determinants of fiscal sustainability in our panel. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical framework 
and addresses data-related issues. Section 3 presents and discusses our main results. The last section 
concludes. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA  
The idea of non-Ricardian regimes rests on the hypothesis that primary budget balances could 
be determined by the government without taking into account the level of government debt. In that 
vision of the world, money and prices would then need to adjust to the level of government debt to 
guarantee the fulfilment of the government intertemporal budget constraint, a passive monetary 
policy. Therefore, in the context of a non-Ricardian regime, the fiscal authority may autonomously 
decide on the budget balance and government debt, influencing the determination of the price level, 
while the monetary authority would, rather unorthodoxly, set endogenously the money supply and 
taking the price level from the government budget constraint. 
The literature has traditionally resorted to two approaches to test empirically for the FTPL: 
i) The backward looking approach (Bohn, 1998) which would imply that, in a Ricardian 
regime1, an increase in the (lagged) level of debt would result in a higher primary 
surplus today; 
ii) The forward looking approach (Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2001) which would imply 
that, in a Ricardian regime, a larger primary surplus today would lead to a reduction in 
the future level of debt. 
In this paper, we follow for the most part the first approach, even though we will also briefly 
resort, for the sake of robustness, to the second approach. That said, we aim to estimate the 
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cointegrating relationship between the primary surplus and the (lagged) level of debt (both 
expressed as ratios to GDP) via the following fiscal reaction function: 
 1t t ts b       (1) 
where tb  is the government debt and ts  is the government primary balance. t  satisfies standard 
assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. 
For our empirical analysis, we focus on a sample of 11 Euro Area countries2 using quarterly 
data between 1999Q1 and 2013Q4. The primary budget balance (% GDP) and the government debt 
(% GDP) are retrieved from Eurostat via Datastream. As already mentioned, and to our knowledge, 
the use of quarterly data to assess fiscal sustainability in a panel framework has not been employed 
for the euro area, another contribution of our paper. 
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Unit Roots and Structural Breaks 
As a first step of the analysis, we investigate the time series properties of the primary surplus and 
debt series. Stationarity-wise, unit root tests can provide a valuable insight into the presence of 
either a deterministic or stochastic secular component in the series. In this context, in addition to 
standard Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests – for purposes of 
robustness and completeness3 – we also conduct the four tests (M-tests) proposed by Ng and Perron 
(2001) (NP) based on modified information criteria (MIC): the modified Phillips-Perron test MZ ; 
the modified Sargan-Bhargava test (MSB); the modified point optimal test TMP ; and the modified 
Phillips-Perron TMZ . These improve the PP-tests both with regard to size distortions and power. 
The results are shown in Table 1a and 1b for the public debt and primary balance, respectively. 
We observe that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected at the 10% level for the 
two series in most cases, independently of the test. Accordingly, both series would be  I(1). 
[Tables 1a, 1b] 
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 The list of countries is: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain. 
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 Moreover, these tests are especially appropriate under certain dynamic data structure, and when their random 





We then resort to unit root tests allowing for breaks and we begin with the Zivot-Andrews 
(1992) (ZA) one. This endogenous structural break test is a sequential test which utilizes the full 
sample and uses a different dummy variable for each possible break date. The break date is selected 
where the t-statistic from the ADF test of unit root is at a minimum (most negative). We 
complement with the modified ADF test proposed by Vogelsang and Perron (1998) (VP) also 
allowing for one endogenously determined break. These test the null of unit root against the break-
stationary alternative hypothesis. 
For the unit root tests that allow for one endogenously determined breaks it is assumed that the 
shift can be modelled by a dummy variable 0tDU  for t≤TB and for t>TB, where TB is the shift 
date (time break). In the time series literature, two generating mechanisms of shifts are 
distinguished, additive outlier (AO) and innovational outlier (IO) models. As discussed in 
Vogelsang and Perron (1998), who consider an unknown shift date situation, the AO framework 
may be preferable to the IO statistics, even if the Data Generating Process (DGP) is an IO process. 
Results in Table 2 suggest that, even after accounting for possible endogeneous breaks in the series 
of interest, the null of unit root against the break stationary alternative is not rejected in most cases. 
[Table 2] 
 
3.2 The Long Run: Cointegration and Stability  
Given the nonstationarity of each individual time series, the relevant question becomes whether a 
linear combination of these two pairs of variables is stationary. If such a combination exists, 
government debt and primary balance become cointegrated, which implies that the variables are 
attracted to a stable long-run (equilibrium) relation and any deviation from this relation reflected 
short-run (temporary) disequilibria. We test for cointegrating relations between primary balance and 
government debt using the Johansen-Juselius methodology. This approach estimates the long-run 
attracting set in a VAR context that incorporates both the short- and long-run dynamics of the 
various models. According to Table 3 cointegration is found in Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland and Netherlands. 
[Table 3] 
 
In order to estimate the parameter   in Equation (1) we resort to the method of Dynamic 





providing a robust correction to the possible presence of endogeneity in the explanatory variable, as 
well as of serial correlation in the error terms of the OLS estimation. Hence, we first estimate a 
long-run dynamic equation including leads and lags of the (first difference) explanatory variable 
and then perform Shin’s (1994) test from the calculation of C  a LM statistics from the DOLS 
residuals which tests for deterministic cointegration, i.e., when no trend is present in the regression. 
The results of the estimation of Equation (1) for each country, in terms of the coefficient   
and the statistic C  appear in Table 4 (where leads and lags of the first difference of the 
explanatory variable were included). Results are twofold: first, since all but four of the 
cointegration statistics are not statistically significant, the null of deterministic cointegration is not 
rejected in those cases; and second, the estimates of   are always positive and significantly 
different from zero at 10% level in four countries, namely Belgium, France, Germany and 
Netherlands. For these countries fiscal policy would have been sustainable and a Ricardian or MD 
regime would have prevailed. This is in line with previous contributions that analyze the case of the 
EU but using annual data instead (e.g. Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2003, 2005; Afonso, 
2008). One caveat here relates to the fact that fiscal authorities might not have behaved in a linear 




Next we examine the possibility of instabilities in the cointegration relationship. As emphasized 
by Bruggemann et al. (2003), it is of some importance to formally investigate the stability of the 
cointegrating vectors further, once a long-run relationship has been identified. The temporal 
stability of estimated relations is also indicative of the usefulness of these relations for policy 
(forecasting) purposes. Hansen and Johansen (1993) outline a procedure that formally tests the 
constancy of cointegrating vectors in the context of Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) 
estimations. Any rejection of the null of cointegration stability (constancy) should emanate from a 
breakdown in the long-run relation, rather than from any positive shift in the underlying short-run 
dynamics. We apply this approach to test the stability of the cointegrating relation. Results (shown 
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in the Appendix) suggest a stable relationship between the primary budget surplus and government 
gross debt.  
 
3.3 The Short Run: Causality and Impulse Response Functions  
A remark is worth making with respect to Equation (1): if a positive and significant coefficient is 
to be found that would be a sufficient condition for solvency, indicating that the government 
satisfies its present-value budget constraint. A problem with such finding is that it is compatible 
with both the MD and FD regimes.5 Hence, we will combine cointegration analysis with Granger-
causality tests. 
With this in mind, we employ Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach for Granger causality. They 
suggest a technique that is applicable irrespective of the integration and cointegration properties of 
the system. The method involves using a Modified Wald statistic for testing the significance of the 
parameters of a VAR(l) model (where l is the lag length in the system). We follow Rambaldi and 
Doran (1996) in formulating these tests. Define maxd as the maximum order of integration in the 
system, a VAR( maxdk  ) has to be estimated to use the Modified Wald test for linear restrictions on 
the parameters of a VAR(k) which has an asymptotic 2 distribution. In our case, we will run a 2 
variables’ VAR (for primary balance and (lagged) debt), with k=3 and 1max d but for the sake of 
notation simplicity, we denote them as , 1,2,3iy i  . For our VAR(4) we estimate the following 
system of equations: 
                 
1
2
1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4
0 1 2 3 4
2 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4
yt t t t t
t t t t t y
ey y y y y
A
y y y y y e
   
   
          
                
            
.    (2) 
The system in (2) is estimated via the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method. The test 
consists of taking the first k VAR coefficient matrix to make Granger causal inference. If, e.g., we 
want to test that ty2 does not Granger-cause ty1 , the null hypothesis will be
(1) (2) (3)
0 12 12 12: 0H      , where 
( )
12
i  are the coefficients of 2 , 1,2,3,4t iy i  . 
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post. Equivalently, in a FD regime, a decrease in the expected primary balance would lead to a decrease in the current 





The results of the causality test for the variables under scrutiny are presented in Table 5. 
Bilateral short-run causality was found for Belgium, Germany and Ireland; whereas short-run 
causality just from debt to primary surplus appears for the Finland, France, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands and Spain. The evidence for the latter set of countries suggests that a MD regime might 
have been present confirming the previous results from Table 4. Finally, no short run causality was 
found in any sense for Austria and Portugal. 
[Table 5] 
 
In order to provide a further robustness check, we discuss some additional results from the so-
called forward-looking approach (Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2001). We present the impulse 
response functions of the debt-to-GDP ratio to innovations in the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio, 
from an estimated VAR in these two variables. The VAR for each country was estimated with 4 
lags and a constant (the optimal lag order was selected using the Akaike information criteria). The 
results are shown in Figure 1, together with one standard deviation bands. As can be seen, a general 
pattern appears: the debt to GDP ratio exhibits a statistically significant negative response following 
an innovation in the surplus-to-GDP ratio in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and Netherlands. Such 
response is increasing for a number of quarters and only in the case of France it becomes stable 
later on. This is in line with Melitz, (2000) who shows that fiscal policy has responded in a 
stabilizing manner for the EU-15 countries. In the remaining cases the response is generally 
negative but estimated with less precision.  
[Figure 1] 
 
3.4 Time-Varying Coefficient Model Estimation 
The next step is to try to uncover the underlying movements in the   coefficient represented in 
Equation (1). That is, we assess how has the so-called fiscal sustainability (or unsustainability) 
parameter of interest changed over time in each country under scrutiny. The model considered here 
generalizes the standard linear regression model by introducing the assumption that the regression 
coefficients may vary over time. Hence, with 
1,𝑡
 denotes the value of the coefficient belonging to 
the first variable at time t, 
2,𝑡
 for the second coefficient, and so forth: 













, … , 
𝑛,𝑡





 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡′
𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑡 . (4) 
Regarding the coefficients  , we assume that they change slowly and unsystematically over 
time (random walk) in the sense that the expectation of today’s coefficient 
𝑡
 is equal to 
yesterday’s state 
𝑡−1
. The change of coefficient i – its disturbance – from period t-1 to period t is 
denoted by 𝑣𝑖,𝑡. It is assumed to be normally distributed with expectation zero and variance 𝜎𝑖
2. 





+ 𝑣𝑡 . 6 (5)  
The variances 𝜎2  and (𝜎1
2, 𝜎2
2, … , 𝜎𝑛
2) are calculated by a method-of-moments estimator that 
coincides with the maximum-likelihood estimator for large samples but is statistically more 
efficient and numerically more transparent and straightforward to interpret in small samples (see 
Schlicht, 1985, 1988). 7 The matrix of the estimated coefficients ̂  is obtained as the expectation of 
 given that data X and y’:  
 ̂ = 𝐸{ |𝑋, 𝑦}. (6)  
Allowing   to be time-varying and running the above model yields the country patterns 
displayed in Figure 2. A common pattern across the different charts is the impact of the global 
economic and financial crisis between 2008 and 2009 in changing the sign of the time-varying 
coefficient from positive to negative in the cases of Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands and Spain. In the remaining countries the sudden drop in magnitude is also visible even 
if the sign does not change. Moreover, the effect of the recovery and initial ease on public finances’ 
burden can be seen in most cases between 2010 and 2011. That said, only Germany managed to 
keep a positive estimated coefficient, that is, fiscal policies remained sustainable throughout the 
whole period.  
[Figure 2] 
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 The model (3), (4) generalizes the classical regression model. If the variances of the disturbances in the coefficients 
(𝜎1
2, 𝜎2
2, … , 𝜎𝑛
2) got to zero, the classical regression model is obtained as a special case. 
7
 The Varying-Coefficient model is statistically superior because it is a two-sided filter, whereas the alternative 
Kalman-Bucy filter is, by construction, one sided. As a consequence, the estimate of the state of coefficients 
𝑡
 at 
time t will depend, in the Kalman-Bucy case, only on past and current but not on future observations. But the current 
state   is correlated with future states and future observations will provide information about the current state. Hence, 
it is inefficient to use a one sided filter. Furthermore, and as a consequence of this, the initial state 
1
 must be 






3.5 Do fiscal rules help sustainability? 
In order to try to understand, under the EU fiscal framework, what can help sustaining a sound 
path for public finances, we take the time-varying estimates 
  as our dependent variable and 
regress it (using as weights the inverse of the standard errors of the  ’s) against several fiscal rules 
(retrieved from the IMF’s Fiscal Rules dataset8). To this end, we rely on the number of existing 
numerical rules and then more specifically on expenditure-type and revenue-type rules. 
We go one step further by considering a logistic regression in assess if fiscal rules increase 
the likelihood of a sustainable fiscal policy. More specifically, we consider the direct impact of 
fiscal rules (rules) and estimate the following model:9 
 Prob(sustainable 1|rules) ( rules),i     (7) 
where   denotes the parameter to be estimated and )(  is the logistic function.10 






sustainable 1  if 0,  and 0 otherwise.





with i = 1, …, 11; t = 1999Q1, …, 2013Q4;  it denotes the country-specific time-varying slope 
coefficients estimated from Section 3.4; i captures the unobserved individual effects; and it is the 
error term. 
The results from both regressions are shown in Table 6. We observe that the simple existence of 
fiscal rules if positively associated with a higher time-varying sustainability coefficient. Moreover, 
the more rules the higher the probability that the time-varying coefficient is positive. These results 
hold particularly strongly for expenditure-based rules, therefore reinforcing the need to have these 








 For details on this binary choice model see, for example, Greene (2012, Ch. 17). 
10
 We should note that, as probit models do not render themselves well to the fixed-effects treatment due to the 






In this paper we revisited the fiscal sustainability question by systematically analysing the 
relationship between the primary surplus and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Focusing on a sample of 11 
Euro-area countries, using quarterly data between 1999Q1 and 2013Q4 and by means of 
cointegration, Granger-causality and impulse response function analyses, we found that: i) fiscal 
policy seems to have been sustainable in Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands and, 
moreover, a Ricardian or monetary dominant regime might have been present in those countries (for 
the remainder of the countries in the sample no firm conclusion could be drawn); ii) debt exhibited 
a statistically significant negative response following an innovation in the budget surplus in half of 
the sample; iii) the time-varying coefficient model exercise uncovers the sizeable negative impact to 
public finances’ sustainability of the global financial crisis, but also some reasons for optimism 
going forward with the recovery process progressing satisfactorily; iv) fiscal rules, expenditure-
based in particular, are strong determinants of fiscal sustainability in our panel. 
All in all, we also found some evidence against the FTPL. That said, it should be recalled the 
important role of fiscal policy within the Euro-area as an instrument available to each country to 
deal with asymmetric shocks and achieve macroeconomic stability. This is particularly true given 
the prominence fiscal rules received in the EMU’s Pact for Stability and Growth, and the ongoing 
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TABLE 1.a Stationarity: Public Debt (%GDP), 1999:1-2013:4 
Countries  
ADF PP KPSS NP 
      MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Austria -1.105 -2.829* 0.335 -5.20 -1.411 0.271 5.216 
Belgium -1.477 -2.290 0.501** -2.700 -1.135 0.420 8.974 
Finland -1.109 -0.659 0.311 -2.267 -0.884 0.389 9.583 
France 0.956 1.344 0.842*** -0.081 -0.034 0.428 15.669 
Germany -0.457 -0.539 0.782*** 0.412 0.325 0.789 40.964 
Greece 0.458 0.724 0.724** 0.846 0.423 0.500 22.070 
Ireland -0.686 1.392 0.638** -30.52*** -3.760*** 0.123*** 1.248*** 
Italy -0.367 0.624 0.509** -23.207*** -3.231*** 0.139*** 1.638*** 
Netherlands 0.186 -0.206 0.591** -0.310 -0.172 0.554 20.627 
Portugal 2.812 2.812 0.793** 3.080 4.035 1.309 163.61 
Spain 0.194 1.112 0.397* -8.806** -1.851* 0.210** 3.688* 
Note: ADF critical values: -4.028, -3.445, -3.145 for 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. For the Ng-Perron test (NP), none of the test statistics are 
significant at the usual levels. The critical values are taken from Ng and Perron (2001), table 1 and the autoregressive truncation lag (zero) has been 
selected using the modified AIC. The null is of unit root.  
 
TABLE 1.b Stationarity: Primary Balance (%GDP), 1999:1-2013:4 
Countries  
ADF PP KPSS NP 
      MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Austria -1.775 -2.075 0.330 -17.17*** -2.929*** 0.170*** 1.429*** 
Belgium 0.849 -1.009 0.812*** -0.532 -0.269 0.505 17.526 
Finland -0.997 -1.322 0.577** -5.262 -1.530 0.291 4.898 
France -1.835 -1.492 0.604** -2.441 -1.012 0.414 9.529 
Germany -3.663*** -2.081 0.087 -32.43*** -3.997*** 0.123*** 0.843*** 
Greece -2.508 -2.271 0.775*** -6.344* -1.663* 0.262* 4.246* 
Ireland -2.777* 1.542 0.624** -1.567 -0.841 0.537 14.794 
Italy -2.274 -1.876 0.526** -3.447 -1.270 0.368 7.091 
Netherlands -2.082 -1.386 0.529** -6.290* -1.640 0.260* 4.323* 
Portugal -2.534 -2.384 0.278 -9.658** -2.193** 0.227** 2.550** 
Spain -0.586 -0.649 0.602** -1.985 -0.763 0.384 10.079 
Note: vide Table 1.a 
 
TABLE 2. Stationarity and Structural Breaks: Public Debt (%GDP), 1999:1-2013:4 
 Public Debt Primary Balance 
Countries ZA VP(AO) VP(IO) ZA VP(AO) VP(IO) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Austria -6.593*** 6.155 2.703 -3.384 -1.906 -2.456 
Belgium -5.462** 0.633 0.826 -5.951*** -5.056** -2.387 
Finland -3.689 7.181 4.117 -4.049 -4.567** -5.287** 
France -3.685 11.304 3.786 -4.386 -9.018** -4.793** 
Germany -3.056 12.529 4.349 -4.646 -2.043 -2.771 
Greece -4.174 16.583 3.969 -5.622*** -7.201** -5.127** 
Ireland -3.622 17.102 5.487 -3.596 -1.072 -3.450 
Italy -4.793 11.972 3.712 -3.318 -1.921 -1.840 
Netherlands -6.876 11.568 6.589 -3.515 -4.546** -5.354** 
Portugal -4.808 8.990 3.891 -4.581 -2.647 -4.776** 
Spain -5.417** 6.910 2.818 -3.360 -5.207** -3.444 
Note: The ZA test statistic reported is the minimum Dickey-Fuller statistic calculated across all possible breaks in the series, when both a break in the 
intercept and the time trend is allowed for. The year in parenthesis denotes the year when this minimum DF statistic is obtained. The 1% critical value 
is -5.57 and the 5% critical value is -5.08. As for the VP test, “AO” means addictive outlier and “IO” means innovational outlier and critical values 
are taken from Perron and Vogelsang (1992), in particular, -3.56 (AO) and -4.27 (IO) for 5% level. For the structural-break type tests t-statistics are 







TABLE 3. Johansen-Juselius Cointegration Tests: Public Debt and Primary Balance 
Null Alternative Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
trace  
            
0r  1r  10.509 11.330 12.526 20.009* 20.487* 14.927 20.779* 12.815 17.576* 14.203 13.47 
1r  2r  3.787 3.921* 3.191 1.650 0.048 0.016 3.040 0.788 1.952 0.919 1.707 
max  
            
0r  1r  6.722 7.408 9.335 18.359* 20.439* 14.911* 17.739* 12.026 15.628* 13.283 11.770 
1r  2r  3.787 3.921* 3.191 1.650 0.048 0.016 3.040 0.788 1.952 0.919 1.707 
Cointegration*             
Note: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% level (based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis p-values). 
 




   2R  
Austria 0.578 0.010 0.131 
 (12.521) (0.183)  
Belgium 12.58** 0.152*** 0.595 
 (5.327) (0.053)  
Finland 1.113 0.077 0.551 
 (5.275) (0.128)  
France 5.948*** 0.096*** 0.834 
 (1.444) (0.022)  
Germany 8.161** 0.127** 0.431 
 (3.302) (0.049)  
Greece 5.369 0.031 0.302 
 (6.542) (0.060)  
Ireland 4.278 0.136 0.772 
 (3.235) (0.086)  
Italy 4.868 0.059 0.479 
 (7.428) (0.067)  
Netherlands 15.814*** 0.296*** 0.810 
 (3.135) (0.058)  
Portugal 3.011 0.017 0.100 
 (3.481) (0.056)  
Spain 3.492 0.061 0.870 
 (3.103) (0.062  
Note: The 
C
 is the Shin (1994) LM statistic which tests for deterministic cointegration. The critical values are taken from Shin (1994), Table 1, for 
m=1. Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for long-run variance. The long-run variance of the cointegrating regression residuals was estimated 
using the Barlett window with )(6 2/1TINTl  as proposed by Newey and West (1987). The number of leads and lags selected was 4q  . *, ** 
and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
TABLE 5. Causality tests – Public Debt and Primary Balance 
 Toda-Yamamoto 
Country/direction 
1t ts b   
Yes/No 
1t tb s   
Yes/No 
Austria 1.231 NO 6.341 NO 
Belgium 11.44** YES 22.59*** YES 
Finland 2.997 NO 18.202*** YES 
France 0.544 NO 49.84*** YES 
Germany 16.89*** YES 8.347* YES 
Greece 3.008 NO 14.92*** YES 
Ireland 39.325*** YES 20.631*** YES 
Italy 2.047 NO 26.613*** YES 
Netherlands 3.334 NO 43.55*** YES 
Portugal 4.346 NO 6.184 NO 
Spain 1.651 NO 28.722*** YES 
Note: In the case of standard Granger-causality tests the null is of non-Granger causality. These tests are based on country-specific VAR(4) where 
lags were identified using Akaike Information Criteria. In the case of the Toda-Yamamoto tests the null is of non-Granger causality – see main text 





TABLE 6. Weighted-Least Squares and Logistic Estimation: 
Fiscal Rules as determinants of Sustainability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regressors/Estimation WLS Logistic 
Number of Numerical Rules 0.0134**   0.346***   
 (0.006)   (0.054)   
Expenditure Rule  0.039**   0.543***  
  (0.017)   (0.011)  
Revenue Rule   0.025*   0.206 
   (0.013)   (0.649) 
Observations 547 547 547 499 499 499 
Adjusted-R2 0.289 0.291 0.288    
log-likelihood    -254.1 -265.1 -259.7 
pseudo-R2    0.261 0.229 0.244 
Notes: Estimation by weighted least squares (with weights the inverse of the standard errors of the estimated time varying coefficients – see 
text for details) and logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-logL/logL0, where L is 
the likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors. Throughout the various specifications, we include country 











Austria 0.008 (>0.2) 
Belgium 0.010 (>0.2) 
Finland 0.017 (>0.2) 
France 0.044 (>0.2) 
Germany 0.012 (>0.2) 
Greece 0.018 (>0.2) 
Ireland 0.029 (>0.2) 
Italy 0.012 (>0.2) 
Netherlands 0.014 (>0.2) 
Portugal 0.011 (>0.2) 
Spain 0.025 (>0.2) 
Note: Probability of parameter instability in parenthesis. According to Hansen (1992) a relation is said to be stable if the estimated probability is 
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Figure 2. Time Varying Coefficient Model Estimation 
























Note: time-varying coefficient model estimation plotting the slope coefficients of a regression of primary balance on lagged debt-to-GDP ratio. 
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